

**FREEDOM, CAUSALITY, AND THE
ANTINOMY OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT**
An Investigation of Kant's Resolution of Two Realms

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It is a commonplace to regard the *Critique of Judgement* as resolution of the problem of the relationship between the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*.¹ Judgement, that third thing that is somehow between understanding and reason, and which corresponds to pleasure (itself a third thing standing between cognition and desire), is the mediator that brings unity to the whole critical project. On this account, judgement is a realm of transcendental activity that attaches on the one hand to the realm of freedom (by virtue of its participation in reason) and on the other to the realm of natural causality (by virtue of its participation in understanding) and brings them together into a common territory. Like many commonplaces, this account of Kant's intentions has some truth to it; but again, like many commonplaces, it is strictly speaking incorrect.

That Kant hoped his treatment of judgement would resolve the aporia he created by holding the phenomenal—as phenomenal—to be the realm of natural causality while relegating freedom to the realm of the noumenal is in a certain sense true. Moreover, it is undeniable that he thought his resolution would be common to the two realms. However, it is not by means of a third realm that this resolution would occur. Moreover, we cannot, on Kant's account, hold judgement to be an independent third thing at all, if by this we mean a realm of transcendental

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¹ Cf., for instance, Michel Despland, *Kant on History and Religion*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1973.

activity with a status corresponding to the realms constituted by understanding and reason. In fact, the nature of judgement and its role in bridging the gap between freedom and causality is more complex than the commonplace picture would lead us to believe. It is the intention of this paper to elucidate Kant's attempt to effect such a resolution in the third *Critique*, and to investigate whether and to what extent this attempt does indeed succeed. It will be argued that although the activity of judgement does provide the type of resolution that Kant had intended for it to, such a resolution does not allow a comprehension of the "common territory" that he correctly saw was necessary in order to provide the real unity of freedom and natural causality that he sought.

In the second introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant writes:

Our whole cognitive faculty has two realms, that of natural concepts and that of the concept of freedom, for through both it is legislative *a priori*... But the territory to which its realm extends and in which legislation is exercised is always only the complex of objects of all possible experience, so long as they are taken for nothing more than mere phenomena... Understanding and reason exercise, therefore, two distinct legislations on one and the same territory of experience, without prejudice to each other.²

In order to understand what Kant means here, we must recognize that he defines territory as "the part of this field [i.e. the place of relation between object and cognitive faculty] in which knowledge is possible," and realm as "the part of this territory, where they [i.e. the concepts of the cognitive faculty] are legislative" (*CJ*, p. 10). Simply put, the territory is that which is or can be experienced—and thus known—while the two realms are the areas within that territory in which freedom and natural causality are, each in its own way, effective. And the question for Kant is how to discover at least a portion of this territory that is common to or unites these two realms.

However, such an articulation of the relationship between freedom and natural causality brings an immediate problem in its wake. The first *Critique* has shown that the proper realm of natural concepts is certainly in the territory of the phenomenal, and the second *Critique* has delineated how we can view freedom as legislative for—but not in—the territory of the phenomenal, or, a complementary problem, what the

² Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement* (tr. J. H. Bernard; New York: Hafner Press, 1951), pp. 10–11. Hereafter referred to in the text as *CJ*.

relationship is between the realm of freedom and that of natural causality. Kant writes:

Now even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom, so that no transition is possible from the first to the second... yet the second is meant to have an influence on the first. The concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity of law to its form at least harmonizes with the possibility of the purpose to be effected in it according to the laws of freedom.

(*CJ*, p. 12)

This, then, is the problem: either we must understand how it is that freedom can be legislative in the territory of the phenomenal, or we will be unable to comprehend a unity between freedom and natural causality. Such an inability would be devastating, for then we would be unable to answer the question, fundamental for Kant of "What is man?", the question underlying the three questions of what I can know, what I ought to do, and what I may hope.³ This is because human being is partially subject to natural causality and partially legislative through the realm of freedom; and if we fail to articulate the relationship between these two aspects of human being, then we will not succeed in understanding the unity that human being must be.⁴ In order to answer the question "What is man?", Kant must provide a justification for predicating both freedom and natural causality of *the same being*. The question is an ontological one, and therefore requires an answer that can show how these two realms can inhabit the same ontological territory. Otherwise, he will be forced either to abandon outright the attempt to answer the question of "What is man?" or to assume rather than prove that his two answers (freedom and natural causality) refer to the same being, thereby begging

³ Kant states that the question of "What is man?" underlies the three others in his *Logic* (tr. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwartz; New York; Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 29.

⁴ The necessity of this unity of human being was argued for by J. Gray Cox in his *The Will at the Crossroads* (Maryland; University Press of America, 1984). Cox argues that human being must be a third ontological category, separate from and yet unifying the phenomenal and the noumenal. He concludes, however, that the problem for Kant is merely to name this unity, while we argue that the unity must also be demonstrated.

the question.⁵ Furthermore, reason, in its attempt to achieve a unified account of reality, will be stymied, its project will fall apart at the seams.

In attempting to resolve this problem we must first understand that the direct path of locating the realm of freedom in the territory of the phenomenal is barred to us. Freedom resides not in the phenomenal but in the noumenal, and were we to be able to locate this realm directly, that would be to be able to understand it through the realm of natural concepts. Such an understanding would bring freedom under the legislation of natural causality, and, as such, it would lose its nature as freedom. That is why Kant remarks in the quote cited above that "there is no transition" from the realm of natural causality to the realm of freedom. Were there such a transition, we would of course not need to bring in another term—that of judgement—to resolve the two realms: they would both be subject to the understanding, at the cost of our freedom. However, as this transition is impossible, we must take another path if we are to understand the place of freedom in the territory of the phenomenal, and thus the relationship between freedom and natural causality.

Kant then introduces the faculty of judgement, which, he says, "may contain in itself, if not a special legislation, yet a special principle of its own to be sought according to laws, though having "no field of objects for its realm, yet may have somewhere a territory with a certain character for which no other principle can be valid" (*CJ*, p. 13). It is this "special principle" which has no realm but does have a territory, that we must understand in order to be able to cite a path toward the resolution of freedom and natural causality. In order to do this, we shall turn to Kant's treatment of judgement, and specifically to his division of judgement into determinant and reflective.

Judgement, as Kant defines it in the third *Critique*, is "the faculty of thinking the particular under the universal" (*CJ*, p. 15). Now this defini-

⁵ Henry Allison has argued recently that Kant's transcendental idealism is not an ontological thesis but an epistemological one, and that therefore freedom and natural causality can be seen as two aspects under which to view human being. Cf. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) and especially *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). While a discussion of whether Kant's idealism should be seen as epistemological or ontological is beyond the scope of this paper, certainly the answer to the question "What is man?", if it is not simply to assume that the two realms of freedom and natural causality refer to the same being, must show their convergence upon it.

tion may appear superficially to differ from his definition of judgement in the first *Critique*, where judgement is said to be "the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it."⁶ However, if we think of judgement as the synthetic activity of bringing together two representations under a common third representation (which may or may not be a concept), then we can resolve these seemingly discrepant definitions in a way that does justice to them both, and that coincides with Kant's other definition of judgement in the first *Critique* as "the faculty of subsuming under rules" (A 132/B 171). Returning to the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant divides judgement into two types:

If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, the judgement which subsumes the particular under it...is *determinant*. But if only the particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the judgement is merely *reflective*.

(CJ, p. 15)

Kant immediately disposes of determinant judgement, which assumes only a secondary role in the balance of the text, by noting that it "only subsumes under universal laws given by the understanding" (CJ, p. 15). This subsumption, we may see at once, is a relegation of the determinant judgement to the role allotted to judgement in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as one of either subsuming intuitions under concepts or subsuming concepts under other, higher order concepts. In other words, the function of the determinant judgement is to legislate in the territory of the phenomenal world through the realm of natural causality.

Faced with this identity of determinant judgement in the third *Critique* with the activity of judgement as the mode of understanding through natural concepts in the first *Critique*, it is perhaps natural to wonder whether there turns out to be some correlation of freedom and the reflective judgement. Should this be so, and we will try to show that indeed it is so, it will be manifest that in attempting to resolve the antinomy of teleological judgement, Kant will as well be offering a solution to the problem of the relationship between freedom and natural causality. However, in order to answer the question of the correlation of free-

⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (tr. Norman Kemp Smith; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A 68/B 93. Hereafter referred to in the text in the standard fashion, by the page numbers of the 1781 edition (A) and the 1787 edition (B).

dom and reflective judgement, we must turn to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, to see how Kant characterizes freedom.

It is worth noting, first, that freedom is a category that is not subsumable under natural concepts or laws. Freedom, Kant says, "is a mere Idea: its objective validity can in no way be exhibited by any possible experience."⁷ Freedom is, in contemporary jargon, a construct; it is not something that we can exhibit in experience, but something without which experience is incomprehensible. "It holds only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being who believes himself to be conscious of a will" (*Groundwork*, p. 127). However, to say that freedom is not comprehensible under natural concepts or laws is not to say that it is without law. Kant identifies freedom more with the concept of autonomy than, as many others have, with lack of determination. This is because for him, the issue of freedom arises as such on the basis of an attempt to make moral law comprehensible and is thus predicated of a being capable of acting in accordance with such law, rather than arising as a foundation upon which the possibility of moral law can be laid. In any case, when Kant says that freedom is "the property this causality [i. e. the causality of the will] has of being able to work independently of *determination* by alien causes" (*Groundwork*, p. 114), we may understand him to be saying that it is not because an act is random or undetermined that we may call it free, but rather because it obeys a determination that is not that of natural causality but of something else.

That "something else" is, of course, reason. Freedom, in essence, is the capacity to utilize reason in order to act in accordance with the moral law, as embodied in the categorical imperative. To see why this is so, we must consider the purpose of reason in human existence. Were the purpose of human existence to be solely one's preservation or welfare, Kant points out, there would be no place in it for reason. "For all the actions he has to perform with this end [i. e. welfare or happiness] in view, and the whole rule of his behavior, would have been mapped out for him far more accurately by instinct" (*Groundwork*, p. 63). Thus reason must have another function if we are to assume (as Kant does) that it is for a purpose that we are endowed with reason. That other function can only be "to produce a *will* which is *good*, not as a *means* to some further end, but *in itself*" (*Groundwork*, p. 64).

⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (tr. H. J. Paton; New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 127. Hereafter referred to in the text as *Groundwork*.

Reason is the foundation for human freedom, because it provides the universality requisite for any conception of morality. Furthermore, the universality it provides is one that is an analogue of natural causality, although neither identical to nor formally associated with it. For what reason requires of free action is that it be performed in such a way as to create the possibility for a universal law of action. In other words, freedom's determination is to will that its action be an instance of a universal law—a law that is not given in the natural order of things, yet would appear to be so if everyone acted in accordance with the categorical imperative. To sum up, then, freedom is the autonomy to act in accordance with the categorical imperative—that is, by virtue of reason—as though each of its actions were an instance of a universal law that it had willed.

At this point we shall turn to the reflective judgement, to see how it accords with this conception of freedom. Kant's initial discussion of the reflective judgement is as follows:

The reflective judgement, which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires on that account a principle which it cannot know from experience, because its function is to establish the unity of all empirical principles under higher ones, and hence to establish the possibility of their systematic subordination. Such a transcendental principle, then, the reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to itself.

(*CJ*, p. 16)

The parallels here are manifest; reflective judgement, like freedom, establishes a universal law for itself—one that is irreducible to, yet analogous with, natural laws—on the basis of a principle that it derives not from experience but from itself. That principle, which must arise through reason because it cannot arise through experience, is that “particular empirical laws, in respect of what is in them left undetermined by these universal laws [i. e. the laws of determinant judgement], must be considered in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an understanding (although not our understanding) had furnished them to our cognitive faculties” (*CJ*, p. 16). In short, the principle of reflective judgement is that nature conforms itself to our understanding.

We will investigate the nature of this “special principle” shortly; what is important to note immediately is that this principle in essence requires that there be an analogue of our freedom in nature—an “intelligence”

(we must use the term loosely, yet guardedly) that creates in nature unities that correspond to universal laws which are themselves not given in nature but only as correlates of reason. The idea of natural purposes, like the idea of freedom, is regulative rather than constitutive: that is, it is not found in nature but nature can be seen in accordance with it. Further, the autonomy of natural purposes is effective upon the natural world, as is the autonomy of freedom. However, unlike freedom, the principle of reflective judgement is predicated to occur not outside of nature but within it. The territory of the phenomenal, in reflective judgement, contains unities that are comprehensible only on the basis of judgements that are about purposes rather than natural causes, unsubsumable unities rather than subsumable ones. Thus, while freedom is applicable to the phenomenal world by creating moral unities through the autonomy of practical action, reflective judgement posits natural unities within that world by means of the act of judging, without which the world would lapse into incomprehensibility. It is this similarity and this difference that Kant refers to when he says that, "This concept [the purposiveness of nature] is also quite different from practical purposes (in human art or in morals), though it is certainly thought according to the analogy of these last" (*CJ*, p. 17).

Reflective judgement, then, is a faculty that is not freedom but is certainly its analogue in the phenomenal world. That analogue accords with the territory that Kant referred to above (and that we will investigate shortly) that is neither under the sway solely of natural causality nor that of freedom, and yet has no special realm of its own. The reason Kant denies reflective judgement a special realm is that for him the only two realms that may be legislative in the territory of the phenomenal are either those of the phenomenal itself—natural causality—or those of the noumenal—freedom. However, a "territory" is beginning to emerge that contains some of what characterizes natural necessity, specifically its residence in the natural world, and some of what characterizes freedom, specifically the autonomy of an "intelligible will" creating unities. In order to settle the question of the relationship between freedom and natural causality, however, two questions need to be addressed. First, how is it that reflective judgement occurs in the natural world—what is its territory? And second, what is the relationship between determinant judgement and reflective judgement?

Our discussion here will concern not the pleasure that arises from a harmony of the faculties in accordance with a "purposiveness without

purpose" (*CJ*, p. 55), but rather the concept of an objective purposiveness of nature corresponding to a territory that may be subject either to determinant or reflective judgement. Therefore, we shall investigate the territory of teleological judgement rather than aesthetic judgement, because it is the former which forms the province of judgement's "special principle" and perhaps contains the goal of our search for a territory common to freedom and natural causality.⁸

Turning to the chapter on the "Critique of Teleological Judgement", then, Kant begins by claiming that our attempt to understand nature is often unavailing when we try to subsume it under laws of natural causality, or what he calls in the third *Critique* "mechanical laws". In those instances, nature becomes comprehensible to us "only by presupposing the idea of the effect of the causality of the cause as the fundamental condition, in the cause, of the possibility of the effect" (*CJ*, p. 213). In other words, in order for nature to accord with the "special principle" of reflective judgement, we must assume in certain cases that there exists not a linear causality of nature but rather a circular one, wherein the effect is the cause of its cause. This idea is of course the idea of a natural purpose, of a teleology wherein the end is assumed to be the effective cause of the causes antecedent to (or in some cases coincident with) it.

Teleological causes or natural purposes occur in what Kant calls an "organized being", that is, a being whose causality is such that it forms an organic whole. Such a being has two distinguishing characteristics: "its parts (as regard their presence and their form) are possible only through their reference to the whole", and "its parts should so combine in the unity of the whole that they are reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form" (*CJ*, pp. 219-220). Of such beings, and only of such beings,

⁸ In choosing the territory of teleological judgement, we are of course also bypassing consideration of moral theology in the Appendix as the unifying principle of freedom and natural causality. J. D. McFarland, in his article "The Bogus Unity of the Kantian Philosophy" (in P. Laberge, F. Duchesneau and B. Morrissey, eds., *Proceedings of the Ottawa Congress on Kant in the Anglo-American and Continental Traditions, Held October 10-14, 1974*, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1976, pp. 280-296) argues that Kant wrongly saw the Appendix's argument from moral theology as containing the ultimate resolution of these two realms. While McFarland is right to argue that such an argument is irrelevant, and even hostile, to considerations of natural causality, the argument we offer here will try to show both that it is in the "Critique of Teleological Judgement" that Kant makes his case for unification, and that Kant himself did not see moral theology as a unifying principle.

we may say that they are natural purposes, or "*organized and self-organizing beings*" (*CJ*, p. 220). However, it is not only certain beings within nature that appear to us as organized through intelligible teleological principles, but in addition the whole of the system of nature itself. "The concept of a natural purpose...leads necessarily to the idea of collective nature as a system in accordance with the rule of purposes, to which all the mechanism of nature must be subordinated according to principles of reason (at least in order to investigate natural phenomena in it)" (*CJ*, p. 225). This is because nature as a system would be incomprehensible to us if we tried to understand it solely in terms of mechanical laws, of which we could posit an infinity of conflicting ones applicable to nature; and so in accordance with the special principle of reflective judgement we must assume that nature is an organized and self-organizing whole.

We must recognize that the concept of natural purpose is not, like that of natural causality, a concept that is constitutive for nature. We cannot make an immediate judgement about a given natural event in terms of teleological principles, only in terms of determinant ones, because our intuitions are given to us only through the categories or pure concepts, which form the universal principles that judgement uses to mediate such intuitions. Teleological judgement, then, can be regulative for our understanding "by a distant analogy with our own causality according to purposes" (*CJ*, p. 22), but cannot be constitutive for it.

However, given this relationship of determinant judgement and teleological judgement, are we not involved in a contradiction rather than a complementarity of the principles of each? Kant claimed above that there are certain natural events that can be understood only in terms of teleology; and yet, all immediate judgement is determinant, subsuming intuitions under the natural concepts of causality, etc. Moreover, even if we understand determinant judgement not in this wider sense but in the more restricted one of subsuming already constituted events under given natural laws, is it not the case that our understanding always seeks to render natural events determinant, so that teleological judgement is not so much a specific type of judgement but an aporia in judgement itself? This contradiction Kant calls the antinomy of teleological judgement, which he lays out formally:

The first maxim of judgement is the *proposition*: all production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to

merely mechanical laws. The second maxim is the *counterproposition*: some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws.

(*CJ*, p. 234)

In order to resolve this antinomy, we need first to understand what is meant by the term "maxim". In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines maxims of reason as "all subjective principles which are derived, not from the constitution of the object but from the interest of reason in respect of a certain possible perfection of the knowledge of the object" (A 666/B 694). He further notes there that although there may be conflicts when principles are viewed as constitutive, when they are viewed as maxims and thus as merely regulative they may coexist without contradiction. Moreover, in the *Groundwork* Kant distinguishes a maxim from an objective principle or natural law by saying that:

The former contains a practical rule determined by reason in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or again his inclinations): it is thus a principle on which the subject *acts*. A law, on the other hand...is a principle on which he *ought to act*—an imperative.

(*Groundwork*, p. 88)

A maxim, then, contains neither the universality of a constitutive principle nor the universality of the categorical imperative; rather it is a rule for action within a given context.⁹ The recommendation that it makes takes the form of a hypothetical imperative, of a means to reach a desired end. (This is so even in the case of a moral action: specific maxims are hypothetical imperatives whose goal is to act in accordance with the categorical imperative.)

In the antinomy of teleological judgement, the goal to be achieved is the knowledge of nature, and the conflicting maxims are "subjective principles" which reason utilizes in order to achieve that knowledge, that is, in order that nature may become comprehensible. Once we recognize this, the appearance of contradiction disappears. The first maxim obviously has to do with determinant judgement, which relies upon a constitutive principle of judging and thus knows nature in accordance with the mechanical laws that arise on the basis of natural concepts. The reflec-

⁹ For more on this, see John Atwell's *Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986), esp. pp. 44–48.

tive, or specifically teleological, judgement which is the source of the counterproposition, clearly operates differently. It does not state that nature is constituted in certain ways, but only that we cannot think of nature except in terms of those certain ways, that nature presents itself to our understanding in such a manner that it seems as though those certain ways—natural purposes—are the ways in which nature must operate. Otherwise put, the first proposition is “dogmatic”, involving the subsumption of events under concepts, while the counterproposition is “critical”, addressing not the events themselves but the ways in which we gain knowledge of them (*CJ*, p. 243). To put it another way, determinant judgement considers natural beings as necessary, with their ground within themselves, while teleological judgement considers (some) natural beings as contingent, with their ground outside themselves (or at least outside their constituent nature) (*CJ*, p. 224). In determinant judgement we say of nature—which we must understand as the territory of the phenomenal—how it is, while in teleological judgement we say of ourselves how it is that we must see certain parts of nature and the system of nature as a whole. In short, the first proposition is a maxim for constitutive principles of judgement, while the counterproposition is a maxim for regulative principles of judgement (of which the special principle of reflective judgement is one).

We are now prepared to ask the final two questions of this study: what exactly is resolved in this resolution of the antinomy, and does that resolution resolve the question of relationship between freedom and natural causality? To answer the first question, the vital issue is how to think the territory of organized beings in terms of its subjection to both determinant and reflective judgement. We can conceive of this resolution in two different ways, assuming Kant has succeeded in giving some sort of resolution, as I have argued above that he has. First, we may see the two maxims of judgement as compatible, as able to coexist in the process of understanding nature. We may call this the weak solution. Alternatively, we may want to see the two maxims as somehow convergent, allowing us not only to understand the same being, for example, either as subject to mechanical laws or as naturally purposive, and this not in separate parts of being but in the being as a whole. On this latter view, determinant judgement cannot replace teleological judgement; rather they coexist even when determinant judgement could account for the phenomenal without help of teleological judgement. We shall call this the strong solu-

tion, because it claims a more profound unity than that of mere compatibility.

We alluded above to Kant's statement that the conception of the relationship between freedom and causality should be one that "at least harmonizes" them (*CJ*, p. 12). This would suggest that he would remain content with the weak solution as a basis for resolution of the larger problem. In his account of the relationship between determinant and teleological judgement at the end of the "Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement", he seems to maintain much the same thing:

We should explain all products and occurrences in nature, even the most purposive, by mechanism as far as it is in our power...But at the same time we are not to lose sight of the fact that those things which we cannot even state for investigation, except under the concept of a purpose of reason, must in conformity with the essential constitution of our reason and notwithstanding those mechanical causes be subordinated by us in accordance with purpose.

(*CJ*, p. 264)

Here Kant suggests that the relationship between the two maxims is asymptotic. Determinant judgement may replace the areas in which we understand nature teleologically through a gradual process of the progress of science, but there may always be areas in which we must think teleologically about nature—for example, in regard to the system of nature as a whole.

This asymptotic interpretation of the relationship between the two maxims accords well with the resolution itself. Kant has argued that the two principles underlying those maxims do not conflict, because they do not apply in the same way to experience. Now if one is constitutive and the other regulative for those parts of nature that cannot be understood constitutively, it makes at least intuitive sense to suppose that the more we learn about the constitution of nature, the less we will have to rely on a regulative principle. Further, as Kant has argued above, since we cannot see into the "first inner ground" of things, it seems that there will always be a place for the maxim of teleological judgement. All this, of course, favors the weak solution.

Kant does, moreover, present an explicit argument that would mitigate against the possibility of holding the strong solution, which we will quote at length:

In the same natural thing both principles cannot be connected as fundamental propositions of explanation (deduction) of one by the other, i.e. they do not unite for the determinant judgement as dogmatic and constitutive principles of insight into nature... One method of explanation excludes the other, even supposing that objectively both grounds of the possibility of such a product rested on a single ground, to which we did not pay attention. The principle which should render possible the compatibility of both in judging of nature must be placed in that which lies outside both...but yet contains their ground, i. e. in the supersensible.

(*CJ*, p. 260)

Kant is arguing two points here. First, it is impossible to explain something we understand teleologically as being at the same time mechanical, for this would be to give a constitutive explanation of regulative judgement, subsuming the reflective under the determinant, and thus violating their nature as separate. Otherwise put, where there arises a universal law to explain phenomena, there is no (or no longer) teleological judgement. This process also holds for the subsumption of the determinant under the teleological. Second, Kant is suggesting that if there were to be a principle that could hold the two together at the same time, it could only reside outside the territory of the phenomenal and would thus be irrelevant for our attempt to comprehend nature itself, given that the limits of our understanding lie at the limits of the phenomenal world. God itself¹⁰ could not help us toward gaining a convergence in this matter, because the bifurcation lies not in the world but in the ways it is possible for us to comprehend it.

Given these arguments both for the weak solution and against the strong one, what may we say about the "transition" between freedom and natural causality that Kant hoped the resolution to this antinomy would provide? Surely he has shown us that we use both principles in our conception of the territory of the phenomenal world, and, if we do not want to argue against his initial bifurcation into constitutive and regulative (which would be a project outside the scope of this current paper), we may accept that he has shown us the range of ways in which we may conceive nature. But has he not, by weakening the antinomy into one of maxims and then proscribing the possibility of a convergence of judge-

¹⁰ And thus no moral theology, as Kant, contra McFarland (see note 7 above), was aware.

ment, so vitiated his account that he is unable to give us a territory on which to conceive freedom and natural causality? Indeed it would seem that he has precluded the very possibility of such a territory. For the organization of an organized being cannot be thought as such in the presence of a plausible determinant explanation; and obversely, inasmuch as we consider something an organized being, it is because we do not think of it determinately.

The territory Kant has offered to us as a resolution to the problem of freedom and natural causality is, in essence, two territories. Kant rightfully argues, as we saw above, that there is no realm over which reflective judgement is legislative; this is because, as regulative, it does not prescribe for nature but only for our understanding of it. But if it has a territory, it is only that territory that is as yet unclaimed by determinant judgement; and if there is any "transition" in all this, it is only the transition from teleological to determinant judgement with the progress of science. We may call the provinces judged by these two forms of judgement a territory if we like: the territory of the phenomenal. But we do so at the cost of enabling the term "territory" to refer to anything that has the possibility of resolving the question of the relationship between freedom and natural causality. That determinant and teleological judgement share a territory in that sense does not allow us even to embark upon, much less to carry through, the resolution of freedom and natural causality.

In the end, we may wonder whether, had Kant been able to find a territory (or a portion of a territory) that was common to determinant and reflective judgement in a way that allowed for some convergence of them—that is, had he been able to offer the strong solution to the antinomy—he would have been able by means of it to solve the problem of the relationship between freedom and natural causality. I would like to suggest here that that would indeed have been possible. For in that case, what would have been conceived would be organized beings that are both subject to laws of natural causality and capable of autonomous self-organization. Such organized beings could, of course, be human beings, beings which are capable of mechanistic explanation but also of a self-organizing principle. In this case, we would be able to think of the self-organizing principle as freedom, and thus consider freedom as the analogue of teleological judgement. This would of course in no way prove the existence of freedom and thus violate Kant's arguments against such a proof, but it would provide a way of thinking freedom within a terri-

tory that is truly the territory of natural causality; in addition, it would allow Kant to answer the foundational question that he posed in the *Logic* as "What is man?" However, all of this runs afoul of Kant's argument against the possibility of convergence;¹¹ and should that argument stand up, we would find ourselves precluded from the possibility of considering the resolution of the antinomy of teleological judgement as a resolution to the problem of the relationship between freedom and natural causality.

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¹¹ This leaves us with the question of whether Kant has truly advanced on this issue from the compatibilism (or, in Allison's interpretation, incompatibilism—see note 5) of his resolution of the Third Antinomy of the first *Critique*.